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Abstract
This paper analyzes the composition of municipal expenditures in Sweden
by estimating a demand system for local public services, in which tax
revenue collection is treated as endogenous. The estimation is based on
the QAIDS speci￿cation. The empirical application uses panel data for
the period 1998-2005 and for six local public services. The results show
that the point estimates of all income elasticities except one are positive,
and that none of them signi￿cantly exceeds one. Furthermore, the point
estimates of the own-price elasticities are negative and less than one in
absolute value for all services.
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1 Introduction
In the literature on local public expenditure determination, the composition
of expenditures has received less attention than the size. Research commonly
focuses on either the determinants of the aggregate expenditure or on the indi-
vidual components. An understanding of the determinants of the expenditure
composition in local jurisdictions is especially important for the central gov-
ernment for two reasons: (1) the design of national policies that redistribute
revenues via an intergovernmental transfer system, and (2) the development of
national policies whose objective is to steer local jurisdictions in a speci￿c policy
direction. This paper, which focuses on Swedish municipalities, simultaneously
analyzes tax revenue collection and how the expenditures are allocated between
di⁄erent local public services. The empirical application is based on panel data
for the period 1998-2005.
Previous studies dealing with the expenditure composition in the local public
sector often assume that the municipality acts as if the policies are decided upon
by a representative individual: solving such a decision problem for the local gov-
ernment yields a system of estimable demand equations. With this approach
expenditure composition problems in the public sector are treated similar to
consumer choices in the private sector. This approach was ￿rst applied by Dea-
con (1978), who extended earlier work in the ￿eld (e.g. Barr and Davies 1966;
Borcherding and Deacon 1972; and Bergstrom and Goodman 1973)1 by estimat-
ing a system of demand equations using US data on local public consumption
expenditure (in the city of Seattle). He found that the local public sector al-
location obeys two basic properties from traditional consumer theory: negative
(compensated) own-price e⁄ects and zero degree homogeneity of demand in in-
come and all prices. Other studies have extended the application of demand
models to the pattern of consumption expenditures of local governments by in-
cluding socio-economic indicators to account for di⁄erences in social needs and
political considerations across local jurisdictions (see Dunne and Smith, 1983;
Dunne et al., 1984; Borge and Rattsł, 1995; Aaberge and Langłrgen, 2003).
1These studies focused either on the aggregate public spending or individual components
of the total.2 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
Earlier research on the composition of local public expenditures typically
focuses on conditional demand systems, in which a given local public budget is
allocated between the service sectors (Deacon, 1978; Borge and Rattsł, 1995).
Such a framework is consistent with the idea of two-stage budgeting, where
the local public revenues are collected in a ￿rst stage and allocated between
the service sectors in a second stage. Analyzing the second step in such a
process, therefore, presupposes that the revenues (or at least most of them)
are predetermined. An alternative approach would be to consider the decision
to collect revenue simultaneous with the decision to allocate resources between
di⁄erent local public services.
In order to fully understand the priorities made by the local public sector,
the benchmark model in this paper does not separate the local public budget
process into two steps. Instead, the benchmark model takes a more comprehen-
sive approach by analyzing a complete system of demand equations, including
private consumption. In order to compare results with previous studies, I also
estimate a demand system that is conditioned on the resources available to the
local public sector. Furthermore, this paper is the ￿rst study that analyzes the
local public expenditure composition using Swedish data.
The approach where a municipality acts "as if" there is a representative in-
dividual that solves the resource allocation problem is referred to as the "com-
munity preference" model in the literature. It is typically assumed that the
single individual allocates her/his resources between consumption of private
goods and public services.2 The present paper uses such a model for local
public expenditures, where a representative agent derives utility from private
and public consumption. The representative agent￿ s demand for each good de-
pends on, e.g., the total per capita income, prices and municipal characteristics.
The demand system is speci￿ed as a ￿ quadratic almost ideal￿demand system
(QAIDS),3 which is an extension to Deaton and Muellbauer￿ s (1980) ￿ almost
ideal￿demand system (AIDS). The advantage with the QAIDS speci￿cation
(which is estimated in terms of expenditure shares), compared to the AIDS
formulation, is that it recognizes the possibility that the expenditure shares are
nonlinear functions of income.4
2The community preference model is used in numerous studies (a review of the early
empirical studies is provided by Gramlich, 1977). A good survey is given by Wildasin (1986).
3See Banks et al. (1997).
4Previous studies on local public expenditure decisions using Swedish data (e.g. AronssonThe Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 3
In Sweden, the municipalities are responsible for providing services such as
child care, comprehensive education and elderly care. The municipalities collect
tax revenues by using a proportional income tax. Other important sources of
revenue are user fees and grants from the central government. The empirical
part of this paper presents results from estimating a complete demand system
consisting of a composite private consumption good and six local public services
(child care, social services, elderly care, comprehensive education, ￿ infrastruc-
ture and protection￿and ￿ other expenditures￿ ). The results show that the point
estimates of all income elasticities except one are positive, and that none of
them signi￿cantly exceed one. Furthermore, the results show that the point
estimates of the own-price elasticities are negative and less than one in absolute
value for all services. The results from the demand system that is conditioned
on the size of the total public expenditure are similar to related studies based
on Norwegian data (Borge and Rattsł, 1995; Aaberge and Langłrgen, 2003).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses a
representative agent model for local public expenditures. Section 3 contains a
description of the data, the empirical model and the estimation method as well
as a discussion of the results. Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 A Representative Agent Model for Local Pub-
lic Expenditures
Earlier research on the composition of local public expenditures often focuses
on a demand system for local public services de￿ned conditional on the revenue
available to the local public sector, i.e. the total resources available for local
public expenditures (Deacon, 1978; Borge and Rattsł, 1995). This approach im-
plies that the local public sector allocates a given resource, e, between a number
of local public services, g1;:::;gn. The desired allocation of public consumption
in this setting is given by maximizing the utility function
u = u(g1;:::;gn;c;￿) (1)
subject to the budget constraint
and Wikstr￿m, 1995; Aronsson et al., 2000; Witterblad, 2007) ￿nd that income e⁄ects are
nonlinear.4 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
n X
j=1
pjgj = ^ e (2)
where c is private consumption, ￿ a vector of characteristics describing the
community, pj (discussed below) the unit price of service j net of matching
grants and ^ e the total local government spending. The outcome of this problem
is a demand system conditioned on ^ e and c, i.e.
gj = ^ fj(p1;:::;pn; ^ e;c;￿) j = 1;:::;n (3)
The demand system given in equations (3) will be referred to as the ￿ conditional
demand system￿ . The conditional demand system addresses how a given local
public budget is allocated between local public services.
Let us now turn to the more comprehensive model (the benchmark model),
which also recognizes how the municipality raises revenue. This model will be
referred to as the ￿ complete demand system￿ . The representative agent still de-
rives utility from the consumption of a private good c, and a bundle of public
services, g1;:::;gn. The local government raises revenues by using a propor-
tional income tax, ￿, matching grants, $1;:::;$n, and a lump-sum transfer
from the central government, z. The allocation of private and public consump-
tion preferred by the representative agent is de￿ned by maximization of the
utility function
u = u(g1;:::;gn;c;￿) (4)
subject to the private and local public budget constraints
c = y(1 ￿ ￿) (5a)
n X
j=1
pjgj = ￿y + z (5b)
where the price of the private consumption good has been normalized to one
and y is the representative agent￿ s gross income. The matching grant to service
sector j is part of pj. By solving equation (5a) for ￿ and substituting into
equation (5b), we can write the budget constraint of the representative agentThe Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 5
as




where the representative agent￿ s e⁄ective income (total income), x, is de￿ned
as x = y + z. Maximizing the utility function with respect to c and g1;:::;gn,
subject to the budget constraints in equation (6), de￿nes the representative
agent￿ s demand for the local public services and the private good as functions
of prices, total per capita income and municipal characteristics
gj = fj(p1;:::;pn;x;￿); j = 1;:::;n (7a)
c = fn+1(p1;:::;pn;x;￿) (7b)
Both the conditional and the complete demand system represent demand sys-
tems where the regular demand restrictions apply for the set of consumer goods
(i.e., adding up, homogeneity and Slutsky symmetry).
A problem in the analysis of the demand for public services is the lack of
appropriate measures of public output. The most common solution is to use
expenditure as a proxy for output. The lack of information on service volumes
also makes the identi￿cation of price e⁄ects problematic. A useful approach to
this problem is to calculate the operating cost per unit of labor corrected for
matching grants (see Ehrenberg 1973; Bahl et al. 1980).5 Following Ehrenberg
and Bahl et al., this paper assumes a labor-intensive Leontief production func-
tion for each public service.6 Nonlabor expenditures (i.e. materials and capital)
are assumed to be proportional to the labor input. Separating the expenditures
into price and volume components gives
ej = (wj + rj)nj = p￿
jnj (8)
where ej is the expenditure in service sector j, w the wage rate, r the cost of
nonlabor input per unit of labor and n the labor input. The net price, p, is
obtained by subtracting the matching grant per unit of labor
pj = p￿
j ￿ ($j=nj) = (ej ￿ $j)=nj (9)
5This "public employment approach" is applied to Norwegian data by Borge and Rattsł
(1995) and Aaberge and Langłrgen (2003).
6It follows, by their approach, that labor is considered to be homogenous within each
service producing sector.6 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
The net price per unit of labor re￿ ects the wage rate, the cost of nonlabor inputs
and the matching grants (the net price is further discussed in the next section).7
3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical part of the paper begins with a description of the data. I will
then present the empirical model and the estimation results.
3.1 Data and some Institutional Characteristics
The sample consists of a panel containing 273 Swedish municipalities over an
eight year period (1998-2005).8 The data were obtained from Statistics Sweden,
the Swedish Labour Market Board and the Swedish Association of Local Au-
thorities and Regions. As mentioned above, Swedish municipalities collect tax
revenues by using a proportional income tax. This tax is the most important
source of funds for the majority of municipalities, followed by user fees and
general grants. The Swedish intergovernmental transfer system is built around
formula-based general grants. A signi￿cant policy reform in 1993 replaced the
previous system of matching grants with a system of general grants. However,
a small number of matching grants was also used by the central government
during the period of study.
Let us now turn to the variables to be used in the estimations. The local
public services examined are: child care, social services, elderly care, compre-
hensive education, ￿ infrastructure and protection￿ 9 (called ￿ infra￿in the tables)
7Another useful approach to identify prices is to calculate the decisive voter￿ s tax price,
which is often measured as the tax share of the median income consumer in the locality
(see Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). The problem with extending a median voter model to a
system of public sector demand equations is that the median individual generally will di⁄er for
di⁄erent services. Extensions of the traditional median voter model (based on deterministic
voting) to the multidimensional case gives a probabilistic voting model (see Enelow and Hinich,
1984, for an overview of probabilistic voting). Craig and Inman (1986) propose a voter group
decision model to solve the multidimensionality problem, where the allocation is a political
compromise among voter groups.
8The number of Swedish municipalities increased during the study period from 288 (1998)
to 289 (1999-2002) to 290 (2003-2005). Three large municipalities are excluded from the study
(Malm￿, G￿teborg and Gotland) due to partly joint expenditures between the municipality
and the region during part of the study period. In addition, twelve municipalities are excluded
due to missing values. This leaves a balanced panel with 273 municipalities.
9The service ￿ infrastructure and protection￿includes expenditures on construction (roads,The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 7
and ￿ other expenditures￿ .10 Together, these six services account for the entire
operating expenditure in the municipalities, ^ e.11 The local public expenditures
are adjusted by Statistics Sweden to ensure that it measures the operating ex-
penditure net of fees and net of services consumed by other municipalities.12
The total per capita income, x, is computed as the sum of the average tax base
in the municipality13 and the per capita lump-sum transfer from the central
government, z.
The demand systems in equations (3) and (7a)-(7b) will be estimated by
using the QAIDS speci￿cation (the speci￿cation is further discussed in the next
subsection). The data available describes service expenditures and not quanti-
ties, which suggests that the demand equations should be estimated in terms
of expenditure shares. It is important to distinguish between the conditional
demand system and the complete demand system when the models are opera-
tionalized. The expenditure shares in the conditional demand system, ^ sj, are
de￿ned as local public budget shares, which means that they are computed as
the expenditure on each service, j, divided by the total local public expendi-
tures, i.e. ^ sj = ej=^ e.14 The private consumption, c, is de￿ned as the total real
per capita income net of local public consumption.15 The expenditure shares
in the complete demand system, sj, are de￿ned in terms of total income, mean-
ing that they are computed as the expenditure associated with each service,
j, divided by the total per capita income, i.e. sj = ej=x. The trends of the
expenditure shares (both in terms of the local public budget and in terms of
income) during the period of study are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix.
The price of each public service, pj, is measured as the operating cost per
parking lots, parks etc.), ￿re services, environmental protection, community protection,
tourism and expenditures for promoting local business.
10The variable measuring ￿ other expenditures￿includes expenditures on central administra-
tion, cultural services, leisure activities and expenditures for special events.
11The municipalities￿business activities are not considered as operating costs. The reason
is that the business activities are ￿nanced by fees and charges and not via the local public
budget.
12The operating expenditure ￿nanced by fees is considered as private consumption by Sta-
tistics Sweden and therefore is not included in this measure of public expenditures.
13An alternative would be to measure the private income net of the taxes paid to the central
and regional governments. Changing the income measure in this way does not alter any of
the main qualitative results.
14See Deacon (1978) and Borge and Rattsł (1995).
15The per capita private consumption is calculated by using the budget constraint given by
equation (6). The variable is adjusted by the CPI (2005 is base year).8 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
unit of labor16 corrected for matching grants, i.e. pj = (ej ￿ $j)=nj.17 It is
reasonable to assume that the labor input, to a large extent, is determined by
the wage rate. The development of the wage rate in di⁄erent service sectors
is expected to be the main source of relative price shift. Higher wage rates or
smaller matching grants increase the prices of public services, which are paid
by the representative agent in the municipality.
There exists a number of speci￿c grants. Some of them are matching while
others are not. The data describing the speci￿c grants is an aggregate of all the
speci￿c grants to each service in each municipality, which leaves two possible
approaches; (1) treating all of them as matching grants or (2) treating all of
them as lump-sum grants. As it turned out, both these approaches give similar
qualitative results. In the main text I will treat all the speci￿c grants as match-
ing.18 The trends of the relative prices during the period of study are shown in
Table A3 in the Appendix.
Following earlier literature on the determinants of municipal expenditures,
the models also include relevant local characteristics such as population den-
sity, age structure of the population, political preferences and political strength.
The age variables correspond to the percentage of residents aged 6 or younger,
CH, residents aged 7-15, Y O, and residents aged 75 or older, EL. The pop-
ulation density, DENS, and the size of the population, POP, are included in
the analysis to detect possible scale e⁄ects.19 The density is measured by the
number of residents per square kilometer. Political preferences are controlled
for by including the share of the seats in the municipal parliament occupied
by members of either the Social Democratic Party or the Left Party, LEFT.
16The hours worked within a service sector is converted into units of labor by the Swedish
Association of Local Authorities and Regions. As a result, one unit of labor corresponds to a
full-time job.
172005 is the base year.
18Earlier studies based on Swedish data for the current study period give no guidance as
to whether the speci￿c grants should be treated as matching or lump-sum grants. A policy
reform implemented in 2002 meant that the majority of the speci￿c grants to the child care
sector became lump-sum grants. The speci￿c grants to the child care sector will, therefore,
be treated as block grants for the years 2002-2005. Estimating a model where all the speci￿c
grants are treated as block grants does not lead to any important changes in the qualitative
results discussed below (the results are available from the author upon request). This suggests
that the variation in the price variables is driven mainly by factors other than the speci￿c
grants.
19See Borge and Rattsł (1993).The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 9
Political strength is represented by a Her￿ndahl index, HERF, i.e. the sum
of the squared shares of each party in the local parliament. Finally, a variable
measuring the unemployment rate, UNEMP, is also included as a control vari-
able. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table A1-A2 in
the Appendix.
3.2 Speci￿cation of the Empirical Model
I apply the QAIDS developed by Banks et al. (1997), implying that the condi-
tional demand system in equations (3) is written as follows
^ si
















t + ^ ￿j ln￿
i
t + ^ ’
i
j + ^ ￿jt + ^ ui
jt
for j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
where superscript i refers to municipality, subscript j to service sector, subscript
t to time period, ’ is a municipality-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿ is a year-speci￿c e⁄ect,
and u is an error term. The public service ￿ other expenditures￿is excluded when
estimating the conditional demand system. The excluded equation follows by




















The QAIDS is a quadratic extension to Deaton and Muellbauer￿ s (1980) almost
ideal demand system. The advantage with the QAIDS speci￿cation, compared
to the AIDS formulation, is that it recognizes the possibility that expenditures
are non-linear functions of income (or total expenditure).
The second speci￿cation that will be estimated is the complete demand
system given by the equations (7a)-(7b)10 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
si


















j + ￿jt + ui
jt
for j = 1;:::;n
The composite private consumer good is excluded when estimating the complete
demand system. The excluded equation follows by adding-up.
Blundell et al. (1993) simplify the estimations by using the Stone price index,
lnPt =
Pn
j=1 sjt lnpjt, instead of the translog form price index, lnai(pt), and by
using unity instead of the price aggregator, lnbi(pt). However, Matsuda (2006)
￿nds that Laspeyre￿ s price index, lnPt =
Pn
j=1 sj￿ t lnpjt, where sj￿ t is the budget
share for service j in the base period ￿ t, performs better than the Stone price
index.20 According to Matsuda, the formulation of the price index is of great
importance (especially if the time series turns out to be nonstationary). This
paper follows Blundell et al. (1993) by replacing the price aggregator lnbi(pt)
with unity, and Matsuda (2006) by using Laspeyre￿ s price index21 (based on
unity in 2005) instead of lnai(pt).22
Income is a potentially endogenous regressor, because a change in the munic-
ipal policy may a⁄ect the labor supply and, to some extent, also the migratory
behaviour (for a similar reason, the total resources available for public con-
sumption and the consumption of the composite private good are potentially
endogenous regressors in the conditional demand system).23 This suggests the
use of an instrumental variables regression (IV) where the total income vari-
ables, ln(xt=Pt) and (ln(xt=Pt))2, are instrumented in the complete demand
system. Similarly, the total expenditure variables, ln(^ et=Pt) and (ln(^ et=Pt))2,
20See also Moschini (1995).
212005 is used as the base year.
22Replacing Laspeyre￿ s price index with Stone￿ s price index does not alter the qualitative
results discussed in the next subsection.
23Empirical studies based on Swedish data ￿nds evidence that a change in taxation a⁄ects
the labor supply (see Blomquist, 1983, and Aronsson and Palme, 1998). The relation between
taxation and migratory behaviour, based on Swedish data, is analyzed by Westerlund and
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and the private consumption, lnc, are instrumented in the conditional demand
system.24 The share of residents with college education, COLLEGE, and the
average age of women giving birth to their ￿rst child, FBORN, are used as
instrumental variables. A lower rate of college education and a lower average
age of women giving birth to their ￿rst child are both expected to result in a
lower income in the municipality. The lag of these variables as well as lagged
exogenous variables25 will also be used as instruments. Each system of demand
equations is estimated by using 3SLS. This approach estimates the demand
equations simultaneously rather than as separate equations, which makes it
possible to analyze cross-price e⁄ects and test for symmetry.
24The lags of the endogenous variables would be valid as instruments in the absence of serial
correlation. However, it turns out that the variables are serial correlated.
25The one and two-period lag of the exogenous variables DENS, POP, LEFT, HERF and
UNEMP are used as instruments.12 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
3.3 Results
The unconstrained parameter estimates for both the complete and the condi-
tional demand system are reported in Tables B1-B2 in the Appendix. The
diagnostics for the ￿rst-stage regression imply that the chosen instruments are
signi￿cant and valid. The conventional test for instrument signi￿cance is the F-
statistic of the joint signi￿cance of the instruments in the ￿rst-stage regression.
However, this test is not valid when there are multiple endogenous regressors
(see Baum et al., 2003). In these cases, Stock and Yogo (2002) suggest using the
Cragg-Donald F-statistic (the authors also compute the critical values).26 The
estimate of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic rejects the null of weak instruments
for both the complete demand system (F= 10:96) and for the conditional de-
mand system (F = 10:41).27 Besides signi￿cance, the instruments also need to
be exogenous, i.e. there shall be no direct e⁄ect of the instruments on the de-
pendent variable (other than through their e⁄ect on the endogenous regressor).
The validity of the instruments is tested by using Hansen￿ s J-test.28 In 8 out of
11 cases, the estimates of Hansen￿ s J cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term at the ￿ve percent level (see
Tables B1-B2 in the Appendix).29
The interpretation of the estimated income and price parameters, i.e. the
estimated ￿:s, ￿:s and ￿:s, will be discussed in terms of income and price elas-
ticities. The formula30 for the income elasticity in the complete demand system
26The Cragg-Donald F-statistic is originally a test of under-identi￿cation.
27The critical value for two endogenous variables, at the ￿ve percent level and allowing for
a maximum relative bias of 10 percent compared to OLS, is 10:84. This level of maximum
bias relative to OLS corresponds to the rule of thumb that, for the case of a single endogenous
regressor, instruments are weak if the ￿rst-stage F-statistic is less than ten. The corresponding
critical value for three endogenous variables is 10:14. Even if the null hypothesis is rejected
for both demand systems, the set of instruments does not seems to be very strong. Estimating
the demand systems by OLS, instead of by IV, does not change the qualitative results further
discussed, neither in terms of point estimates of the elasticities nor in terms of t-values (one
exception is that the t-value for the budget-elasticity for ￿ infra￿in the conditional demand
system turns signi￿cant, which suggests that ￿ infra￿ is a luxury good in the local public
budget).
28This test is applicable in the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
29Estimations where COLLEGE and FBORN are used as including instruments (only the
lag of these variables and lagged exogenous variables are used as excluding instruments), do
not alter the qualitative results discussed in this section.
30The formulas for the income and price elasticities are derived in Blundell et al. (1993).The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 13
is given by
Ei
jt = (￿j + 2￿j lnmi
t)=si
jt + 1 (14)
where mi
t = xi
t=Pt. The formula for the uncompensated price elasticity of service
j with respect to the price of service k is given by
Ei
jkt = (￿jk=si
jt) ￿ (￿j + 2￿j lnmi
t)(si
k￿ t=si
jt) ￿ hjk (15)







The corresponding elasticities in the conditional demand system, to be called
^ Ei
jt, ^ Ei
jkt, and ^ Si
jkt respectively, are measured in the same general way. The
income elasticity will be denoted ￿ budget elasticity￿in the conditional demand
system (where ^ mi
t = ^ ei
t=Pt). Note that the budget elasticity measures the
percentage change in the quantity demanded if the real public budget increases
by one percent. The price elasticities referring to the conditional demand system
re￿ ect increased costs of local services within a given local public budget.
The Conditional Demand System
The elasticities associated with the conditional demand system are presented
in Table 1. Child care and elderly care are the services with the lowest point
estimate of the budget elasticity, 0.80, whereas ￿ infra￿is the service with the
highest point estimate, 2.09.31 Using that the sum of the weighted budget
elasticities (where ^ Ei
jt is weighted by ^ si
jt) is equal to one32 gives a point esti-
mate of the budget elasticity for the excluded service, ￿ other expenditures￿(i.e.
expenditures on cultural services, leisure activities, central administration and
special events), equal to 1.09. The signi￿cance of the parameter estimates of
the budget elasticities are tested with t-tests. None of the t-tests reject the null
hypothesis that the budget elasticity is equal to one at the ￿ve percent signi￿-
cance level. This suggests that the budget elasticities are interpretable as if all
31The elasticities in the conditional demand system are evaluated at the mean of the data
(the budget shares are evaluated at the base year).
32This is true by de￿nition and easy to obtain by using
P
j(@^ sj=@ ^ m) = 0.14 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
services are normal goods (at the mean of the data) in the local public budget.
￿ Infra￿is close to being considered a luxury good, but the null hypothesis that
the elasticity is one cannot be rejected at the ￿ve percent level (t = 1.81).
Comparing the point estimates of the budget elasticities between budget-
quartiles (the municipalities are sorted with respect to the size of the total per
capita budget) implies only small di⁄erences in the point estimates (the budget
elasticities for each budget-quartile is presented in Table B3 in the Appendix).
The coe¢ cients of the conditional demand system reveal that the nonlinear
e⁄ects of the total expenditure is signi￿cant (at the ￿ve percent level) in three
out of ￿ve cases, which supports the use of QAIDS.
All the compensated own-price elasticities resulting from the conditional de-
mand system are negative, suggesting that the negativity condition is ful￿lled.
The compensated own-price elasticities vary between -0.57 for education and
-0.86 for social service. All the compensated cross-price elasticities are positive
and relatively small (typically much smaller than the own-price elasticities).
On the other hand, the uncompensated cross-price elasticities are in general
negative, suggesting that the negative income e⁄ect dominates the positive sub-
stitution e⁄ect.
There are no previous studies, based on Swedish data, dealing with a con-
ditional demand system for local public services. However, the Swedish local
public decision structure resembles the Norwegian one in many respects (e.g.
the organization of the public sector and the services provided by the local gov-
ernments). Earlier research on the composition of local public expenditures in
Norway are based on models resembling the conditional demand system (Borge
and Rattsł, 1995; Aaberge and Langłrgen, 2003).33 Consistent with the Norwe-
gian study by Aaberge and Langłrgen, ￿ infra￿is a sector with a relatively high
point estimate of the budget elasticity. Also the budget elasticities for child
care, elderly care and ￿ other expenditures￿ 34 resemble the corresponding bud-
get elasticities in the study by Aaberge and Langłrgen. Our point estimate of
33The system of ￿nancing the local public services in Norway is more centralized than in
Sweden. The maximum tax rate that the Norwegian municipalities are allowed to use is set
by the central government. Municipalities that set a higher tax rate than the one decided
upon by the central government are expected to be penalized via the grant system.
34The point estimate of budget elasticity for ￿ other expenditure￿ (i.e. expenditures on
cultural services, leisure activities, central administration and special events) is compared
with the point estimates of the budget elasticities for ￿ administration￿and ￿ cultural services￿
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the budget elasticity of education, 1.01, is somewhat higher than the estimates
found on Norwegian data (Borge and Rattsł, 1995; Aaberge and Langłrgen,
2003) and earlier studies based on US data (Feldstein, 1975; Ladd, 1975).
Borge and Rattsł (1995) ￿nd that local public services and private consump-
tion cannot be treated as separable. In the present study, a t-test shows that
public services and private consumption cannot be treated as separable in the
equation for social services (see Table B1 in the Appendix). Furthermore, a
Likelihood ratio-test rejects a restricted version of the conditional demand sys-
tem where private consumption is excluded, compared to the alternative where
private consumption is included (￿2
[5] = 32:49).35 This suggests that private
consumption is not separable from the consumption of public services.
Table 1. Elasticities referring to the Conditional Demand System
A. Budget Elasticities:
Commodity j
Child Social Eld Edu Infra
0.80 1.04 0.80 1.01 2.09
(-0.72) (0.07) (-1.26) (0.07) (1.81)
B. Compensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra
Child -0.73 0.05 0.25 0.08 0.13
(-32.60) (1.88) (2.02) (0.59) (4.82)
Social 0.10 -0.86 0.39 0.03 0.05
(1.80) (-115.6) (1.45) (0.09) (2.71)
Eld 0.20 0.25 -0.59 0.29 0.59
(2.99) (1.64) (-54.43) (14.91) (3.66)
Edu 0.28 0.23 0.33 -0.57 0.51
(4.30) (1.61) (29.96) (-36.25) (3.25)
Infra 0.08 0.05 0.34 0.05 -0.81
(1.82) (5.01) (1.49) (0.18) (-75.91)
(Continued on next page).
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Table 1. (Continued)
C. Uncompensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra
Child -0.83 -0.07 0.16 -0.04 -0.12
(-15.49) (-1.26) (1.10) (-0.26) (-1.73)
Social 0.05 -0.92 0.35 -0.03 -0.07
(0.73) (-26.04) (1.24) (-0.11) (-1.40)
Eld -0.06 -0.08 -0.85 -0.03 -0.07
(-2.06) (-2.00) (-14.58) (-0.53) (-1.53)
Edu -0.01 -0.14 0.05 -0.93 -0.25
(-0.30) (-2.02) (0.74) (-15.16) (-3.16)
Infra 0.02 -0.02 0.28 -0.02 -0.95
(0.37) (-0.56) (1.19) (-0.09) (-20.26)
Note: t-values in parentheses. Under the null hypotheses it is
assumed that the budget elasticities are equal to one and that the
price elasticities are equal to zero.
The Complete Demand System
The elasticities in Table 2 refer to the complete demand system.36 The com-
plete demand system recognizes that the local public expenditure composition
is determined simultaneously with the collection of local public revenues. So-
cial service has the lowest point estimate of the income elasticity, -0.51. For all
other services, the point estimate of the income elasticity is positive. ￿ Infra￿is
the service with the highest point estimate of the income elasticity, 1.37. As
can be seen from Table 2, t-tests can reject the null hypothesis that the income
elasticity is equal to one for social services, elderly care and education. The null
hypothesis that the income elasticity is equal to zero is rejected for all services
except for social services (t = -1.41), which is close to being considered an in-
ferior good. The t-tests imply that all services, except for social services, are
normal goods at the mean of the data. Elderly care and education are neces-
sities if measured at the mean of the data, meaning that the estimates of the
income elasticity for these services are signi￿cantly positive and signi￿cantly
less than one.
36The elasticities in the complete demand system are evaluated at the mean of the data
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Comparing the income elasticities between income-quartiles (the municipal-
ities are sorted with respect to the size of the total per capita income) indicates
only small di⁄erences (see Table B3 in the Appendix). The parameter estimates
of the complete demand system show that the nonlinear e⁄ect of the total in-
come is signi￿cant in ￿ve out of six cases at the ￿ve percent level (see Table B2
in the Appendix), which motivates the use of the QAIDS.
The compensated own-price elasticities implied by the complete demand
system are negative for all services. The lowest absolute value is found for
education, 0.75, while the highest value is found for social services, 0.89. In
general, the compensated cross-price e⁄ects are positive and quite small. The
point estimates of the uncompensated cross-price elasticities di⁄er in sign across
services and are relatively small in absolute value.
It is not easy to relate the results in Table 2 to earlier Swedish studies, as
these have either focused on the determinants of aggregate local public spending
(Aronsson and Wikstr￿m, 1996; Dahlberg and Jakobsson, 2000),37 or individual
components of total spending (Ahlin and Johansson, 2001).38 In general, the
income elasticities are smaller than the corresponding budget elasticities in the
conditional demand system (especially for social services). All the own-price
elasticities in the complete demand system are higher in absolute value com-
pared to the own-price elasticities in the conditional demand system. Finally,
both demand systems imply that the cross-price elasticities are relatively small
(at least by comparison with the own-price elasticities).
What will happen to the share of income spent on municipal services, as the
total per capita income increases in the municipality? The marginal e⁄ect that











(￿j + 2￿j lnmi)=mi (17)
37Using the median voter approach when analyzing the determinants of the total local public
expenditures in Sweden, Aronsson and Wikstr￿m (1996) estimated the income elasticity to
be 0.82 and the price elasticity to be 0.53 in absolute value. Dahlberg and Jakobsson (2000)
also analyze the total local public expenditures in Sweden and found income elasticities in
the interval 0.47-1.30 and price elasticities in the interval 0.67-1.48 in absolute value.
38Ahlin and Johansson (2001) estimated the income elasticity for local school expenditures
in Sweden to be 0.73-1.13 by using a method based on survey data.18 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
where the summation represents the six local public services included in the
regression of the complete demand system. Calculating the marginal e⁄ect (as
an average for all municipalities) implies that the total local public budget, as
a share of the total income, decreases by 0.09 percentage points when the real
total per capita income increases by 1000 SEK. Comparing the marginal e⁄ect
between income-quartiles indicates only small di⁄erences.
Table 2. Elasticities referring to the Complete Demand System
A. Income Elasticities:
Commodity j
Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
0.83 -0.51 0.43 0.49 1.37 1.24
(-0.91) (-4.16) (-4.40) (-5.00) (0.79) (0.80)
B. Compensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
Child -0.77 0.02 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.17
(-60.12) (0.75) (5.98) (6.78) (2.01) (7.97)
Social 0.03 -0.89 0.29 0.32 0.04 0.01
(2.88) (-119.8) (4.66) (5.17) (3.96) (0.76)
Eld 0.02 -0.07 -0.79 0.11 0.15 0.12
(1.13) (-1.53) (-67.82) (11.44) (2.67) (3.28)
Edu 0.12 -0.05 0.17 -0.75 0.05 0.28
(4.95) (-0.99) (10.16) (-67.61) (0.82) (6.93)
Infra 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.28 -0.83 0.04
(1.30) (0.33) (4.64) (5.49) (-71.29) (5.12)
Other 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.26 0.06 -0.85
(3.50) (1.27) (4.87) (5.94) (2.79) (-61.42)
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Table 2. (Continued)
C. Uncompensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
Child -0.80 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.13
(-53.48) (1.39) (4.85) (5.61) (0.61) (5.73)
Social 0.02 -0.88 0.28 0.31 0.02 -0.01
(1.27) (-95.14) (4.41) (4.92) (1.29) (-1.22)
Eld -0.05 -0.02 -0.82 0.07 0.02 0.01
(-2.87) (-0.66) (-48.91) (4.36) (0.63) (0.29)
Edu 0.04 0.00 0.08 -0.79 -0.08 0.16
(1.86) (0.06) (4.56) (-49.75) (-1.67) (4.72)
Infra -0.01 0.01 0.23 0.27 -0.86 0.02
(-0.52) (1.32) (4.27) (5.11) (-62.67) (1.53)
Other 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.25 0.03 -0.88
(1.32) (1.89) (4.37) (5.41) (1.27) (-56.01)
Note: t-values in parentheses. Under the null hypotheses it is assumed that
the income elasticities are equal to one and that the price elasticities are
equal to zero.
Turning to the e⁄ects of local characteristics (the vector ￿) implied by the
complete demand system (see Table B2 in the Appendix), the results are quali-
tatively similar to those of earlier comparable literature on local public expendi-
tures.39 Recall that the municipalities are responsible for providing child care,
comprehensive education and elderly care. We ￿nd that the higher the share of
individuals in the age corresponding to child care (0-6), primary education (7-
15), and the oldest residents in the municipality (75-), respectively, the higher
the expenditure share in the corresponding service sector. Political preferences
have signi￿cant e⁄ects on the expenditures: the results suggest that a munic-
ipality represented by a large share of left wing seats in the local parliament,
ceteris paribus, is associated with higher expenditure shares on elderly care and
￿ infra￿ . A higher rate of unemployment contributes to a higher expenditure
share on education.40
Finally, the results have been used for testing the general restrictions of the
demand system. Tests of homogeneity and symmetry are given in Tables B1-B2
in the Appendix. A Likelihood ratio-test rejects a restricted demand system
39Replacing the local characteristics with the one-period lag of the local characteristics does
not alter the qualitatively results.
40Many municipalities o⁄er comprehensive education also to adults.20 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
(where all the restrictions are imposed) against the unconstrained alternative
for both the complete demand system (￿2
[26] = 397:09) and the conditional
demand system (￿2
[19] = 344:19).41 However, even if homogeneity and Slutsky
symmetry are imposed, this does not alter the main ￿ndings discussed above.
The estimation results from the restricted versions of the demand systems, and
a discussion of the restrictions, are presented in the Appendix C.
4 Conclusion
This paper, which concerns the determinants of municipal expenditures in Swe-
den, simultaneously analyzes tax revenue collection and how the resources are
allocated between di⁄erent local public services. In order to understand the
priorities made by municipalities, a complete demand system is required, im-
plying that private consumption is also considered in the model. The empirical
study is based on panel data for the period 1998-2005 and contains results from
estimating a demand system comprising a composite private consumption good
and six local public services. The local characteristics that a⁄ect the allocation
of local public consumption according to the theoretical model, such as total
per capita income, prices, and municipal characteristics, are considered in the
regressions. The results show that the point estimates of all income elasticities
except one are positive, and that none of them signi￿cantly exceed one. Among
the results, it is also found that the own-price elasticities are negative and less
than one in absolute value for all services.
For purposes of comparison, we also estimate a demand system that is con-
ditioned on the total revenue that can be used for local public consumption.
The results from this conditional demand system are similar to related studies
based on Norwegian data (Borge and Rattsł, 1995; Aaberge and Langłrgen,
2003).
41The critical value, at the ￿ve percent signi￿cance level, is 38:89 when testing the complete
demand system, and 30:14 when testing the conditional demand system.The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 21
Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Table A1. Description of the variables
Variable Description
sj The expenditure on service j as a share of the total income in the
municipality.
￿ sj The expenditure on service j as a share of the local public budget.
pj The price of the local public service j.
x Total income, the sum of the tax base and the general
grants (SEK per capita).
Œ Total budget (SEK per capita).
c The consumption of the composite private good (SEK per capita).
CH The percentage of residents aged 6 or younger.
YO The percentage of residents aged 7-15.
EL The percentage of residents aged 75 or older.
DENS The population density, residents per square kilometer.
POP The population size, number of persons.
LEFT The percentage of Social Democrats and Left Party members in
municipal parliament.
HERF A Her￿ndahl index (in percent) measuring political
strength in the municipal parliament.
UNEMP The percentage of unemployed.
FBORN The average age of women giving birth to their ￿rst child.
COLLEGE The percentage of residents with college education.
Table A2. Summary statistics, 1998-2005
Variable Mean Std.dv. Min Max
￿ m 36109 4820 22261 54203
m 127777 15020 94217 219500
ca) 91911 13547 63569 180656
CH 7.32 1.07 4.71 11.77
YO 12.41 1.13 6.81 16.43
EL 9.70 2.23 2.85 16.03
DENS 105.7 346.9 0.1 4107.0
POP 29244 51739 2553 771038
LEFT 46.93 11.28 11.11 77.42
HERF 24.81 4.36 16.60 45.47
UNEMP 3.98 1.44 0.9 10.9
FBORN 27.43 1.24 23.02 33.03
COLLEGE 13.89 5.12 6.72 39.71
Note: The ￿gures are unweighed averages over the estimation
period using a sample of 273 municipalities (out of 290). The
variables ￿ m and m are de￿ ated by Laspeyre￿ s price index.
a) The private consumption is de￿ ated by the
Swedish CPI(2005=100).22 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden













1998 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1999 101.03 101.90 105.13 99.03 100.28 98.06 100.27 103.04
2000 101.90 102.86 100.82 99.67 100.43 96.54 99.08 107.47
2001 103.05 103.54 97.85 100.20 100.40 92.73 101.12 112.87
2002 104.52 107.14 104.54 100.02 99.39 90.22 100.91 117.69
2003 106.01 108.19 102.24 100.06 99.64 88.82 100.97 122.14
2004 106.99 109.83 101.42 99.91 99.51 90.44 100.08 126.62
2005 107.90 109.80 100.16 99.23 100.38 91.29 99.05 129.73
Note: The ￿gures are unweighted averages over the estimation period using a sample
of 273 municipalities (out of 290). The price index P is the Laspeyre￿ s price index.
Table A4. The Expenditure Shares
A. In terms of Total Public Expenditures
Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
Average budget shares (multiplied by 100) 1998-2005
1998 11.7 6.2 29.4 35.2 7.6 10.0
1999 11.3 5.9 30.2 36.0 7.3 9.4
2000 10.9 5.9 31.0 36.6 7.0 8.7
2001 10.7 5.6 31.5 36.7 7.0 8.5
2002 11.4 5.6 31.6 36.2 6.9 8.3
2003 11.6 5.7 31.8 35.9 6.8 8.1
2004 11.7 5.8 31.7 36.1 6.8 8.0
2005 12.0 5.8 31.6 35.9 6.8 7.9
Cross-section variation in the budget shares, 2005
Min 5.7 1.4 13.4 26.4 2.5 3.9
Max 21.2 11.1 42.3 48.2 14.9 13.0
Stdev 2.8 1.9 4.8 3.4 1.7 1.5
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Table A4. (Continued)
B. In terms of Total Income
Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other Private
Average budget shares (multiplied by 100) 1998-2005
1998 3.3 1.7 8.6 10.1 2.2 2.9 71.3
1999 3.2 1.7 8.9 10.4 2.2 2.7 70.9
2000 3.0 1.6 8.9 10.4 2.0 2.5 71.5
2001 3.0 1.6 9.1 10.4 2.0 2.4 71.5
2002 3.2 1.6 9.2 10.3 2.0 2.4 71.4
2003 3.3 1.6 9.2 10.2 2.0 2.3 71.4
2004 3.2 1.6 8.9 10.0 1.9 2.2 72.1
2005 3.2 1.6 8.8 9.9 1.9 2.2 72.4
Cross-section variation in the budget shares, 2005
Min 1.9 0.5 3.0 4.9 0.8 0.9 63.2
Max 5.0 3.1 15.2 13.1 5.3 3.8 82.3
Stdev 0.5 0.5 2.1 1.2 0.6 0.5 3.2
Note: The ￿gures are unweighted averages over the estimation
period using asample of 273 municipalities (out of 290).24 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
Appendix B: Estimation Results
Table B1. The Parameter Estimates from the Conditional DS
Share Equations
Variable Child Social Eld Edu Infra
ln￿ m -0.090￿ 0.369￿￿￿ 0.127 0.011 -0.089
(-1.73) (7.29) (1.57) (0.14) (-1.37)
(ln￿ m)2 0.003 -0.017￿￿￿ -0.009￿￿ -0.000 0.008￿￿￿
(1.18) (-6.74) (-2.20) (-0.09) (2.34)
lnPchild 0.018￿￿￿ -0.004 -0.003 -0.011￿￿￿ -0.005
(6.62) (-1.62) (-0.77) (-2.70) (-1.61)
lnPsocial 0.000 0.005￿￿￿ -0.002￿￿￿ -0.003￿￿￿ 0.001￿
(0.50) (10.86) (-2.45) (-5.30) (1.81)
lnPeld -0.008￿￿￿ -0.005￿￿ 0.028￿￿￿ -0.010￿￿￿ -0.004
(-3.57) (-2.18) (8.19) (-3.09) (-1.35)
lnPedu -0.002 -0.008￿￿ -0.003 0.025￿￿￿ -0.016￿￿￿
(-0.63) (-2.14) (-0.58) (4.36) (-3.25)
lnPinf ra -0.002￿￿￿ -0.001￿ -0.005￿￿￿ -0.001￿ 0.009￿￿￿
(-4.02) (-1.70) (-5.15) (-1.68) (11.95)
lnPother -0.001 -0.001 -0.004￿￿ -0.000 -0.001
(-0.64) (-1.09) (-2.21) (-0.43) (-0.49)
lnc 0.022 -0.053￿￿￿ 0.004 -0.012 0.003
(1.12) (-2.85) (0.14) (-0.43) (0.14)
lnCH 0.039￿￿￿ -0.034￿￿￿ 0.041￿￿￿ -0.040￿￿￿ -0.010
(6.38) (-5.66) (4.36) (-4.48) (-1.25)
lnYO 0.009 -0.058￿￿￿ 0.015 0.069￿￿￿ -0.050￿￿￿
(0.83) (-5.77) (0.95) (4.51) (-3.88)
lnEL -0.005 -0.023￿￿￿ 0.081￿￿￿ -0.029￿￿￿ 0.000
(-0.65) (-3.37) (7.55) (-2.87) (0.04)
lnPOP 0.036￿￿￿ -0.100￿￿￿ -0.033 0.043￿￿ 0.025
(2.72) (-7.85) (-1.62) (2.26) (1.55)
lnDENS 0.003 -0.001 -0.021￿￿￿ -0.002 0.017￿￿￿
(0.58) (-0.23) (-2.49) (-0.22) (2.51)
lnLEFT 0.004 -0.003 0.011￿￿￿ -0.012￿￿￿ 0.006
(1.36) (-1.02) (2.49) (-2.88) (1.56)
lnHERF -0.002 0.002 -0.016￿￿￿ 0.002 0.003
(-0.65) (0.76) (-3.86) (0.41) (0.95)
lnUNEMP 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(1.13) (-0.10) (-0.83) (-0.52) (-0.17)
R2 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.79
Listed variable, ￿2
[17] 170.33￿￿￿ 37.82￿￿￿ 475.49￿￿￿ 670.58￿￿￿ 54.58￿￿￿
Mun. e⁄ects, ￿2
[272] 22.68￿￿￿ 29.01￿￿￿ 33.30￿￿￿ 20.45￿￿￿ 15.57￿￿￿
Time e⁄ects, ￿2
[7] 20.91￿￿￿ 4.69￿￿￿ 13.70￿￿￿ 8.44￿￿￿ 3.12￿￿￿
Hansen J, p-value 0.11 0.13 0.01￿￿￿ 0.28 0.06￿
Homogeneity, t-value 0.49 -1.68￿￿ 0.79 -0.11 -1.43
No. of observations 2184 2184 2184 2184 2184
No. of municipalities 273 273 273 273 273
Symmetry: ￿ij= ￿ij, ￿2
[10]= 2:78; ￿i= ￿￿i, ￿2
[4]= 9:96
Note: t-values in parentheses. The regressions in Table B1 include municipality speci￿c
e⁄ects and period speci￿c e⁄ects. ￿￿￿,￿￿ and ￿ denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10
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Table B2. The Parameter Estimates from the Complete DS
Share Equations
Variable Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
lnm -0.016￿￿ 0.064￿￿￿ 0.048￿￿￿ -0.002 -0.032￿￿￿ -0.041￿￿￿
(-1.98) (8.26) (3.07) (-0.16) (-2.70) (-4.43)
(lnm)2 0.000 -0.004￿￿￿ -0.004￿￿￿ -0.002￿￿ 0.002￿￿ 0.002￿￿￿
(0.80) (-6.94) (-3.87) (-2.15) (2.01) (3.08)
lnPchild 0.006￿￿￿ 0.000 0.002￿￿￿ 0.003￿￿￿ 0.000 0.003￿￿￿
(15.06) (0.96) (2.85) (4.08) (0.75) (6.20)
lnPsocial 0.000 0.001￿￿￿ 0.000 -0.001￿￿￿ 0.001￿￿￿ -0.000
(1.31) (12.41) (0.05) (-2.45) (2.79) (-0.99)
lnPeld -0.002￿￿￿ -0.000 0.011￿￿￿ 0.001 0.001 0.000
(-3.04) (-0.79) (10.92) (0.97) (0.67) (0.34)
lnPedu 0.001￿ -0.000 0.004￿￿￿ 0.015￿￿￿ -0.002￿ 0.004￿￿￿
(1.80) (-0.04) (2.82) (14.11) (-1.65) (4.80)
lnPinf ra -0.000￿￿￿ -0.000 -0.001￿￿￿ 0.000￿ 0.003￿￿￿ 0.000￿￿￿
(-3.21) (-0.75) (-2.64) (1.77) (13.04) (2.86)
lnPother 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002￿￿￿ 0.001￿ 0.003￿￿￿
(1.00) (0.94) (0.22) (4.57) (1.65) (9.09)
lnCH 0.012￿￿￿ -0.007￿￿￿ 0.011￿￿￿ -0.007￿￿￿ -0.003 0.001
(6.53) (-4.31) (3.17) (-2.33) (-1.24) (0.50)
lnYO 0.005￿￿ -0.011￿￿￿ 0.010￿￿ 0.038￿￿￿ -0.009￿￿￿ 0.008￿￿￿
(2.10) (-4.83) (2.30) (9.63) (-2.61) (3.03)
lnEL -0.001 -0.001 0.026￿￿￿ -0.002 0.003 -0.005￿￿￿
(-0.34) (-0.78) (7.30) (-0.54) (1.00) (-2.47)
lnPOP 0.010￿￿￿ -0.019￿￿￿ -0.004 0.027￿￿￿ 0.016￿￿￿ 0.018￿￿￿
(3.19) (-6.12) (-0.60) (4.94) (3.42) (4.99)
lnDENS 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.007￿￿￿ 0.001
(0.69) (0.31) (-1.27) (0.58) (3.15) (0.64)
lnLEFT 0.001 -0.000 0.005￿￿￿ -0.001 0.003￿￿ -0.001
(1.54) (-0.25) (3.17) (-0.78) (2.16) (-1.49)
lnHERF 0.001 0.001 -0.003￿￿ 0.003￿￿ 0.002 0.004￿￿￿
(0.66) (1.32) (-2.26) (2.09) (1.61) (4.61)
lnUNEMP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002￿￿￿ 0.001 0.001￿
(0.90) (1.14) (0.69) (2.78) (1.13) (1.74)
R2 0.83 0.89 0.97 0.94 0.84 0.88
Listed variable, ￿2
[16] 163.93￿￿￿ 32.29￿￿￿ 301.32￿￿￿ 498.48￿￿￿ 40.59￿￿￿ 90.82￿￿￿
Mun. e⁄ects, ￿2
[272] 18.75￿￿￿ 26.89￿￿￿ 44.08￿￿￿ 23.34￿￿￿ 16.06￿￿￿ 22.10￿￿￿
Time e⁄ects, ￿2
[7] 33.39￿￿￿ 3.41￿￿￿ 25.89￿￿￿ 9.99￿￿￿ 4.73￿￿￿ 17.02￿￿￿
Hansen J, p-value 0.13 0.06￿ 0.08￿ 0.00￿￿￿ 0.07￿ 0.02￿￿￿
Homogeneity, t-value 5.27￿￿￿ 1.50 7.91￿￿￿ 11.70￿￿￿ 2.18￿￿ 8.02￿￿￿
No. of observations 2184 2184 2184 2184 2184 2184
No. of municipalities 273 273 273 273 273 273
Symmetry: ￿ij= ￿ij, ￿2
[15]= 4:22; ￿i= ￿￿i, ￿2
[5]= 11:61
Note: t-values in parentheses. The regressions in Table B2 include municipality speci￿c e⁄ects
and period speci￿c e⁄ects. ￿￿￿,￿￿ and ￿ denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
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Table B3. The Sum of the Budget and Income Elasticities
Budget Elasticities Resulting from the Conditional Demand System
Commodity j
Child Social Eld Edu Infra
Entire sample 0.79 1.04 0.79 1.01 2.15
(-5.03) (0.32) (-5.93) (11.49) (3.96)
1st quartile 0.81 1.14 0.78 1.01 2.21
(-5.19) (2.38) (-5.02) (10.03) (4.54)
2nd quartile 0.80 1.07 0.79 1.01 2.20
(-4.41) (2.55) (-5.42) (10.99) (3.88)
3rd quartile 0.79 1.02 0.79 1.01 2.16
(-5.83) (1.04) (-7.50) (12.02) (3.98)
4th quartile 0.76 0.91 0.81 1.01 2.05
(-6.18) (-0.92) (-9.45) (14.37) (3.87)
Income Elasticities Resulting from the Complete Demand System
Commodity j
Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
Entire sample 0.82 -0.67 0.39 0.48 1.40 1.26
(-6.72) (-2.67) (-3.39) (-7.06) (3.02) (3.14)
1st quartile 0.82 -0.57 0.45 0.51 1.36 1.23
(-7.68) (-3.22) (-5.09) (-9.89) (3.24) (4.93)
2nd quartile 0.82 -0.61 0.41 0.49 1.38 1.24
(-7.07) (-3.14) (-3.67) (-9.83) (3.34) (4.09)
3rd quartile 0.83 -0.66 0.39 0.49 1.41 1.26
(-6.92) (-2.94) (-3.71) (-8.14) (3.25) (4.01)
4th quartile 0.83 -0.85 0.30 0.45 1.46 1.31
(-6.01) (-2.20) (-3.02) (-5.57) (2.94) (2.70)
Note: t-values in parentheses. It is assumed that the budget and income
elasticities are equal to one under the null hypothesis.
Appendix C: The Restricted Models
Since homogeneity in all prices (
Pn
k=1 ￿jk = 0) is a within-equation restriction,
it is su¢ cient to test for it by estimating each equation separately. According
to the t-statistic in Table B2, homogeneity is rejected at the ￿ve percent level
for all service sectors except social services.
Given the standard Slutsky symmetry restriction on the price parameters
(￿jk = ￿kj), a second condition is required aiming to satisfy proportionality
between the parameters associated with lnm and (lnm)2 (i.e. ￿j = ￿￿j, whereThe Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 27
￿ = 0 implies that the demand system is linear in income).42 The symmetry
restrictions are tested by using a Wald ￿2-test. According to the ￿2-statistics
in Tables B1-B2, all the symmetry restrictions are rejected at the ￿ve percent
level.
The income and price elasticities corresponding to the restricted versions
(homogeneity and Slutsky symmetry are imposed) of the models are presented in
Tables C1-C2. The results imply that neither the relative size of the income (or
budget) elasticities, nor the negativity of the own-price elasticities, are altered
when the restrictions are imposed. Most of the cross-price elasticities have the
same sign. None of the cross-price elasticities that are signi￿cantly negative
in the unrestricted models become signi￿cantly positive, or vice versa, in the
restricted model.
Table C1. Elasticities in the Restricted Conditional Model
A. Budget Elasticities:
Commodity j
Child Social Eld Edu Infra
0.92 0.20 0.91 0.98 1.37
(-0.67) (-3.42) (-1.28) (-0.41) (1.41)
B. Compensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra
Child -0.75 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.12
(-77.85) (2.26) (3.25) (2.25) (5.46)
Social 0.07 -0.86 0.20 0.10 0.05
(3.32) (-127.1) (1.74) (0.82) (6.90)
Eld 0.24 0.05 -0.60 0.29 0.36
(6.92) (0.58) (-84.93) (41.07) (4.50)
Edu 0.28 0.03 0.32 -0.57 0.45
(6.98) (0.31) (40.58) (-97.79) (4.95)
Infra 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.10 -0.80
(3.60) (7.49) (1.83) (1.00) (-90.33)
(Continued on next page).
42This restriction is required in order to satisfy the integrability conditions of demand theory
(see Blundell et al., 1993).28 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
Table C1. (Continued)
C. Uncompensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra
Child -0.86 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.04
(-46.17) (2.77) (0.88) (0.09) (-3.61)
Social 0.02 -0.87 0.14 0.04 -0.03
(0.73) (-57.98) (1.24) (0.35) (-1.26)
Eld -0.05 -0.02 -0.88 -0.02 -0.08
(-5.05) (-2.02) (-40.00) (-0.79) (-7.11)
Edu -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.92 -0.04
(-5.44) (-4.71) (-0.40) (-44.85) (-4.08)
Infra -0.00 0.04 0.11 0.04 (-0.89)
(-0.03) (3.29) (1.13) (0.35) (-45.69)
Note: t-values in parentheses. Under the null hypotheses it is assumed that
the budget elasticities are equal to one and that the price elasticities are
equal to zero.
Table C2. Elasticities in the Restricted Complete Model
A. Income Elasticities:
Commodity j
Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
0.99 -0.36 0.59 0.66 1.40 1.66
(-0.05) (-3.81) (-3.20) (-3.30) (0.87) (2.17)
B. Compensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
Child -0.82 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.04
(-84.13) (0.20) (3.40) (3.82) (0.46) (4.13)
Social 0.02 -0.89 0.21 0.21 0.01 -0.00
(1.81) (-127.7) (3.40) (3.41) (1.94) (-0.68)
Eld 0.02 -0.05 -0.81 0.06 0.05 0.08
(0.95) (-1.55) (-109.0) (11.41) (1.20) (2.85)
Edu 0.05 -0.09 0.09 -0.83 0.10 0.14
(2.44) (-2.51) (9.26) (-138.6) (2.37) (4.64)
Infra -0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.18 -0.85 0.02
(-0.20) (-1.42) (3.28) (3.57) (-85.92) (3.42)
Other 0.02 -0.01 0.14 0.16 0.03 -0.89
(2.75) (-0.88) (3.35) (3.71) (4.23) (-78.08)
(Continued on next page).The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 29
Table C2. (Continued)
C. Uncompensated Price Elasticities:
Commodity j
Commodity k Child Social Eld Edu Infra Other
Child -0.86 0.01 0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.01
(-72.69) (1.87) (2.34) (2.73) (-4.55) (-1.17)
Social 0.00 -0.89 0.20 0.20 -0.01 -0.03
(0.18) (-101.7) (3.15) (3.16) (-0.86) (-2.94)
Eld -0.07 -0.02 -0.87 0.01 -0.07 -0.07
(-6.56) (-1.68) (-62.92) (0.47) (-6.82) (-4.87)
Edu -0.05 -0.05 -0.00 -0.90 -0.03 -0.02
(-5.23) (-5.50) (-0.26) (-74.81) (-3.28) (-1.66)
Infra -0.02 0.02 0.15 0.17 -0.87 -0.01
(-1.93) (2.23) (2.91) (3.20) (-71.81) (-1.09)
Other -0.00 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.00 -0.93
(-0.08) (0.12) (2.86) (3.21) (0.13) (-69.95)
Note: t-values in parentheses. Under the null hypothesis it is
assumed that the income elasticities are equal to one and that the
price elasticities are equal to zero.30 The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden
References
[1] Aaberge, R. and Langłrgen, A. (2003) Fiscal and Spending Behavior of
Local Governments: Identi￿cation of Price E⁄ects when Prices are not
Observed. Public Choice 117, 125-161.
[2] Ahlin, ¯. and Johansson, E. (2001) Demand for Local Public Schooling:
Evidence from Swedish Survey Data. O¢ ce of Labour Market Policy Eval-
uation (IFAU).
[3] Aronsson, T., Lundberg, J., and Wikstr￿m, M. (2000) The Impact of Re-
gional Public Expenditures on the Local Decision to Spend. Regional Sci-
ence and Urban Economics 30, 185-202.
[4] Aronsson, T. and Palme, M. (1998) A Decade of Tax and Bene￿t Reforms
in Sweden: E⁄ects on Labour Supply, Welfare and Inequality. Economica
65, 39-67.
[5] Aronsson, T. and Wikstr￿m, M. (1995) Regional Responses in Local Public
Spending to Intergovernmental Grant Reform - An Application to Swedish
Municipalities. Ume￿ University.
[6] Aronsson, T. and Wikstr￿m, M. (1996) Local Public Expenditures in Swe-
den: A Model where the Median Voter is not Necessarily Decisive. The
European Economic Review 40, 1705-1716.
[7] Bahl, R., Johnson, M.B., and Wasylenko, M. (1980) State and Local Gov-
ernment Expenditure Determinants: The Traditional View and a New
Approach. In R. Bahl, J. Burkhead and B. Jump, Jr.,(eds), Public Em-
ployment and State and Local Government Finance. Ballinger, Cambridge,
MA.
[8] Banks, J., Blundell, R. and Lewbel, A. (1997) Quadratic Engel Curves and
Consumer Demand. Review of Economics and Statistics 79, 527-539.
[9] Barr, J.L. and Davies, O.A. (1966) An elementary political and economic
theory of the expenditure of local governments, Southern Economic Journal
33, 149-165.
[10] Baum, C.F., Scha⁄er, M.E., and Stillman, S. (2003) Instrumental Variables
and GMM: Estimating and Testing. The Stata Journal 3(1), 1-31.The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden 31
[11] Bergstrom, T.C. and Goodman, R.P. (1973) Private demands for public
goods. American Economic Review 63, 280-296.
[12] Blomquist, N. S. (1983) The E⁄ects of Income Taxation on the Labor
Supply of Married Men in Sweden. Journal of Public Economics 22, 169-
197.
[13] Blundell, R., Pashardes, P. and Weber, G. (1993) What do we Learn About
Consumer Demand Patterns from Micro Data? American Economic Re-
view 83(3), 570-597.
[14] Borcherding, T.E. and Deacon, R.T. (1972) The demand for the service of
non-federal governments. American Economic Review 62, 891-901.
[15] Borge, L-E. and Rattsł, J. (1993) Dynamic Responses to Changing De-
mand: A Model of the Reallocation Process in Small and Large Munici-
palities in Norway. Applied Economics 25, 589-598.
[16] Borge, L-E. and Rattsł, J. (1995) Demographic shift, relative costs and
the allocation of local public consumption in Norway. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 25, 705-726.
[17] Craig, S.G. and Inman, R.P. (1986) Education, Welfare and the ￿ new￿Fed-
eralism: State Budgeting in a Federalist Public Economy. The University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[18] Dahlberg, M. and Jakobsson, J. (2000) An Investigation of Preferences for
Publicly Provided Goods. Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
[19] Deacon, R.T. (1978) A demand model for the local public sector. Review
of Economics and Statistics 60, 180-202.
[20] Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980) An Almost Ideal Demand System.
American Economic Review 70, 312-326.
[21] Dunne, J.P., Pashardes, P. and Smith, R.P. (1984) Needs, costs and bu-
reaucracy: The allocation of public consumption in the UK. Economic
Journal 94, 1-15.
[22] Dunne, J.P. and Smith, R.P. (1983) The allocative e¢ ciency of government
expenditure: Some comparative tests. European Economic Review 20, 381-
394.[23] Ehrenberg, R.G. (1973) The Demand for State and Local Government Em-
ployees. American Economic Review 63, 366-379.
[24] Enelow, J.M. and Hinich, M.J. (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
[25] Feldstein, M.S. (1975) Wealth Neutrality and the Local Choice in Public
Education. American Economic Review 65(1), 75-89.
[26] Gramlich, E.M. (1977) Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empir-
ical Literature. Lexington: Lexington Books.
[27] Ladd, H.F. (1975) Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity, and
the Composition of the Property Tax Base. National Tax Journal 28(2),
145-158.
[28] Matsuda, T. (2006) Linear Approximations to the Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System. Empirical Economics 31, 663-675.
[29] Moschini, G. (1995) Units of Measurement and the Stone Index in Demand
System Estimation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, 63-
68.
[30] Stock, J.H. and Yogo, M. (2002) Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear
IV Regression. NBER Technical Working Paper 284.
[31] Westerlund, O. and Wyzan, M. L. (1995) Household Migration and the
Local Public Sector: Evidence from Sweden, 1981-1984. Regional Studies
29(2), 145-157.
[32] Wildasin, D.E. (1986) Urban Public Finance. New York: Harwood Acad-
emic Publishers.
[33] Witterblad, M. (2007) Income Heterogeneity and the Flypaper E⁄ect.
Ume￿ Economic Studies No 718.